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Construal level theory (CLT) is an account of how psychological distance influences individ-
uals’ thoughts and behavior. CLT assumes that people mentally construe objects that are psy-
chologically near in terms of low-level, detailed, and contextualized features, whereas at a
distance they construe the same objects or events in terms of high-level, abstract, and stable
characteristics. Research has shown that different dimensions of psychological distance (time,
space, social distance, and hypotheticality) affect mental construal and that these construals,
in turn, guide prediction, evaluation, and behavior. The present paper reviews this research
and its implications for consumer psychology.
One of the primary aims of consumer psychology is to
understand the way in which individuals evaluate objects
and events. Numerous studies have led to an understanding
that evaluations are driven not only by the quality and desir-
ability of an object, but also by a variety of less central fac-
tors. What, then, determines the type of factors that will be
most influential in determining choice at any given point?
Construal level theory (CLT), a recent framework linking
distance and abstraction, suggests that psychological dis-
tance is one important determinant of whether primary,
essential characteristics or secondary, peripheral character-
istics are used as the basis of evaluation. The current paper
describes this framework in more detail, explaining its basic
theoretical approach and reviewing a range of related
empirical findings. We begin by providing more precise
definitions of the terms “level of construal” and “psycho-
logical distance,” and then use these constructs to examine
shifts in representation, prediction, evaluation, and behavior.
LEVEL OF CONSTRUAL
According to CLT, individuals use concrete, low-level con-
struals to represent near events and abstract, high-level con-
struals to represent distant events. Low-level construals are
relatively unstructured, contextualized representations that
include subordinate and incidental features of events. High-
level construals, in contrast, are schematic, decontextual-
ized representations that extract the gist from the available
information. These construals consist of a few superordinate
core features of events. Thus, whereas representations of
near future events are rich in details, some of which are
incidental or peripheral, representations of distant events
achieve abstraction by omitting secondary and incidental
features.
Consider, for example, two children playing catch with a
ball in a backyard. A low-level construal of this activity
might include such details as the age of the children, the
color of the ball, and the temperature outside. In contrast, a
high-level construal of this activity might simply be “having
fun.” Note what happens when we move from one depiction
to the other. The high-level construal, “having fun,” disre-
gards the unique features of the event and involves an
implicit decision about which features are central to the
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event and which are peripheral. Of course, given a different
context or goal, the event could be represented in a different
high-level manner. For instance, if the children were sup-
posed to be studying but instead were playing, the activity
of playing ball could be abstractly perceived as “wasting
time.” Regardless of the particular abstract conceptualiza-
tion chosen, moving to the abstract level involves omitting
features that are perceived as less important to the abstract
construct in question; at the same time, this decontextualiza-
tion links the activity with a more general set of events,
bringing in new meaning and definition that is not included
in the low-level representation.
Of course, the process of abstraction is not an all-or-none
phenomenon. The more unique and incidental features omit-
ted, the more abstract and schematic the representation
becomes. Thus, many categorization schemes are organized
hierarchically, including object categorization (e.g., recliner –
chair – furniture), trait categorization (e.g., plays the piano –
musical – talented), and goal-directed action categorization
(e.g., reading a textbook – doing well on an exam – succeeding
academically). As one moves to higher levels in the hierarchy,
representation is increasingly less specific and more abstract.
Again, CLT’s basic premise is that the more psychologi-
cally distant an event is, the more it will be represented at
higher levels of abstraction. An event is in some manner
psychologically distant whenever it is not part of one’s
direct experience; inasmuch as there are multiple dimen-
sions along which an event can be removed from direct
experience, there are multiple dimensions of psychological
distance. For example, an event is more psychologically
distant as it takes place farther into the future, as it occurs in
more remote locations, as it is less likely to occur, and as it
happens to people less and less like oneself. Therefore, the
greater the temporal, spatial, hypothetical, or social distance
from an event, the more distant it appears and the more
abstractly we would expect it to be represented (see Liberman,
Trope, & Stephan, [2007], for a more detailed discussion).
This hypothesized relationship between psychological
distance and abstraction may be a result of the association
that exists between direct experience and event information.
When something occurs in the “here and now” we tend to
have a lot of information about it (we are, after all, currently
experiencing it), and we therefore think of it in concrete, low-
level terms that make use of the rich and contextualized detail
that is available. Typically, as an event is further removed
from direct experience (i.e., is more distant), we have less
available and reliable information about it, leading to the
formation of a more abstract and schematic representation
of the event. CLT thus assumes that an association forms
between psychological distance and abstraction, and that
this association is overgeneralized so that it influences rep-
resentation even in situations where there is equivalent infor-
mation about near and distant events. Thus, we would expect
to see a relationship between distance and construal even
when the amount and reliability of information is constant.
We now move from describing the basic premise of CLT
to reviewing research in support of it. Because our explora-
tion of these ideas originated with a particular focus on tem-
poral distance (see Liberman & Trope, 1998), we start by
reviewing findings linking construal and temporal distance;
we then expand to describe recent evidence showing similar
construal effects for the dimensions of spatial distance,
social distance, and hypotheticality. After describing these
effects on representation, we review evidence for construal-
related effects on prediction, evaluation, and behavior. We
conclude by revisiting the general psychological distance
construct, as well as by suggesting new directions for the
study of construal as it impacts consumer behavior.
DISTANCE AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION
Distance and Mental Representation: Time
Numerous studies have examined the hypothesis that distant
future events are represented in a more abstract, structured,
high-level manner than near future events. For example,
Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope (2002) used measures of
structure and categorization breadth to examine temporal
differences in construal. In one study they asked individuals
to imagine a set of scenarios (e.g., a camping trip, a friend’s
visit to NY) to occur in either the near or distant future. For
each scenario, participants grouped a set of related objects
(e.g., tent, ball, snorkel) into as many groups as they
deemed appropriate. Consistent with the idea that partici-
pants thinking about the events occurring in the distant
future thought about the objects in more superordinate,
abstract terms, these participants created fewer groups out
of the objects than participants in the near future condition.
A second study looked at the structure underlying partici-
pants’ preference judgments for events to happen in the near
and distant future. Multidimensional scaling results showed
that fewer dimensions were necessary to explain the same
amount of variance in distant future preferences than in near
future preferences, indicating that distant future representa-
tions were characterized by a simpler underlying structure
than were near future representations.
Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, and Trope (2006) also
used structural measures to examine differences in con-
strual, focusing in particular on temporal shifts in the struc-
ture of self-representation. Using a variety of self-structure
measures, they found that distant future self-representations
were simpler and more integrated than near future self-rep-
resentations. For example, in one study participants com-
pleted a measure of self-concept differentiation (Donahue,
Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993) in which they rated them-
selves on a variety of personality adjectives for five differ-
ent social roles (e.g., student, child, friend). Results showed
that personality ratings were more similar across social roles
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one year later than when thinking of themselves the follow-
ing day. That is, the distant self was thought of in a more
integrated, structured manner, whereas the near self was
more contextualized and fluid.
Other studies have measured construal by examining
shifts in identification, as opposed to structure. Liberman
and Trope (1998), for instance, looked at measures of action
identification, distinguishing between a high-level identifi-
cation in which the activity is linked to its superordinate
purpose (the “why” of the activity) and a low-level identifi-
cation in which the activity is linked to its subordinate
means (the “how” of the activity). In one study, participants
provided an open-ended description of a series of events
that were to occur in the near or distant future. Results
showed that distant future activities (e.g., studying) were
more likely to be identified in high-level (e.g., doing well in
school) rather than low-level (e.g., reading a textbook)
terms. Participants also completed the Behavioral Identifi-
cation Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989), a previ-
ously established measure of action identification. For each
activity listed in this measure, participants choose between
one of two identifications: an identification option related to
the “why,” abstract aspect of the activity, and one related to
the “how,” concrete aspect of the activity. As expected, par-
ticipants thinking about events in the distant future were
more likely to choose the “why” identification than those
thinking of near future events.
Also distinguishing between superordinate purposes and
subordinate means, Day and Bartels (2004) asked partici-
pants to judge the similarity of pairs of actions in order to
investigate temporal changes in representation. Some of the
action pairs were similar at the superordinate, high-level
while others were similar at the subordinate, low-level. For
example, the activity “going to the dentist” was similar to
the activity “joining a health club” at the high-level (both
involve promoting one’s health). In contrast “going to the
dentist” was similar to the activity “getting a tattoo” at the
low-level (both involve sitting in a chair and undergoing a
painful procedure). As expected, when the actions were
described as occurring in the distant future, event pairs with
abstract, high-level commonalities were seen as more simi-
lar than event pairs with low-level procedural commonali-
ties; in the near future condition this difference was
significantly minimized.
Nussbaum, Trope, and Liberman (2003) focused on a
different aspect of high-level construal: the tendency to
identify behaviors in terms of underlying traits. Reasoning
that traits are abstract, generalized representations, they pre-
dicted that with increased temporal distance, participants
would be more likely to characterize behavior in terms of
dispositional traits and thus less likely to consider the
impact of situational constraints on behavior. In line with
this reasoning, findings demonstrated that the correspondence
bias (the tendency to underweight low-level, situational con-
straints on observed behavior, cf. Jones & Harris, 1967) was
more pronounced when behavior was used for predicting
the distant future than the near future.
Temporal differences in abstraction have also been found
at the level of visual perception. Förster, Friedman, and
Liberman (2004) asked people to complete various tasks
that required the abstraction of coherent images from frag-
mented or noisy visual input. For example, in one study par-
ticipants completed the Gestalt Completion Test (Ekstrom,
French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), in which they were pre-
sented with black fragments of a complete picture and told
to structure the information into a whole and close the
visual gestalt. Consistent with CLT, participants’ perfor-
mance increased when they imagined working on the task in
the distant future as opposed to the near future, suggesting
that temporal distance not only leads one to adopt abstract-
vs. concrete-language-based representations, but also that it
facilitates abstract processing more generally.
Converging evidence thus suggests that distant future
events are represented in an abstract, structured manner that
emphasizes superordinate features, while near future events
are represented in a concrete, contextualized manner that
includes an emphasis on subordinate features. We now turn
to recent evidence examining the relationship between con-
strual and the dimensions of spatial distance, social dis-
tance, and probability.
Distance and Mental Representation: Space
A number of studies have established a link between spatial
distance and mental construal. For example, students at
NYU’s Washington Square campus watched a video of two
students interacting and provided a written description of
the activity in the video (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, &
Liberman, 2006). In the spatially near condition, partici-
pants believed that the individuals in the video were NYU
students studying at the Washington Square campus in New
York City; in the spatially distant location, participants
believed that the individuals in the video were NYU students
studying at an NYU study-abroad location in Florence, Italy.
Participants’ written descriptions were analyzed for abstract-
ness of language, using coding schemes developed for the
Linguistic Categorization Model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988).
Findings showed that participants who believed that the
video protagonists were located in a spatially distant loca-
tion used more abstract language in describing the events in
the film than those who believed the video protagonists
were located in a spatially near location.
Henderson, Fujita, Trope, and Liberman (2006) also
examined the construal of spatially near and distant events.
In one study, they asked NYU participants to divide an
ongoing behavioral sequence into as many sections as they
deemed appropriate (cf. Newtson, 1973). Participants
viewed an animated film developed by Heider and Simmel
(1944) that shows two triangles and a circle moving against
and around each other; all were told that the film depicted86 TROPE, LIBERMAN, WAKSLAK
the action of three teenagers around a cabin at a well-known
summer camp. In the spatially near condition, the camp was
said to be located on the East Coast, whereas in the spatially
distant condition, the camp was said to be located on the
West Coast. As expected, participants created fewer, more
broad sections out of the video when they believed that the
campers it depicted were in a spatially distant, as opposed to
spatially near, location.
Distance and Mental Representation: Social Distance
Liviatan, Trope, and Liberman (2006) examined construal
effects related to similarity, one form of social distance. The
less similar someone is to oneself, the more socially distant
they typically seem; therefore, the researchers hypothesized
that behavior performed by a dissimilar other would be rep-
resented at a higher level of construal than behavior per-
formed by a similar other. Participants read about a target
person who had attended either similar or different classes
as themselves. (This information was elicited in a mass test-
ing session at the beginning of the semester and was
provided in the experimental session as “background infor-
mation” about the target individual.) They then imagined
the student engaging in various activities; for each activity,
participants chose between a subordinate action identifica-
tion (description emphasizing the means by which the
action is performed) and a superordinate action identifica-
tion (description emphasizing the end for which the action
is performed). As would be expected if dissimilar targets’
actions are represented in higher level terms than similar
targets’ actions, participants’ preference for superordinate
relative to subordinate action identifications was greater for
a dissimilar than similar target.
Another form of social distance that has been linked to
construal is power. Reasoning that elevated power increases
the psychological distance one feels from others, Smith and
Trope (2006) examined the relationship between power
activation and abstraction. For example, in one study partic-
ipants completed a writing task that activated the experience
of either low or high power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee,
2003); they then completed a measure of inclusiveness of
categorization (Rosch, 1975), indicating to what degree
atypical exemplars (e.g., purse) were good members of a
given category (e.g., clothing). In line with the hypothesis
that power priming leads to more abstract thinking and thus
greater breadth of categorization, the results showed that
high-power primed participants were more inclusive in their
categorization than low-power primed participants.
Distance and Mental Representation: Probability
Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, and Alony (2006) reasoned that
independent of its spatiotemporal and social distance, an
event is removed from one’s direct experience when it
could have happened but has not actually happened or when
it is possible but not certain. An improbable event would
thus seem more distant than a probable event, and the lower
the probability of the event, the greater its psychological
distance. On the basis of this assumption, a series of studies
were conducted to examine the relationship between proba-
bility and mental construal. For example, one study used a
categorization task (previously used by Liberman et al.,
2002, described above), in which participants grouped
objects related to each of four scenarios into as many groups
as they deemed appropriate. Participants were asked to
imagine that they were either highly likely or highly
unlikely to engage in the scenario. As expected, participants
in the high-likelihood condition created fewer, broader groups
out of the objects than participants in the low-likelihood
condition.
The effect of probability on mental construal emerged on
identification measures as well. For example, participants in
one study received a flyer advertising a paid research assis-
tant position described in broad, general terms (e.g., helping
behavior research) as well as in specific, low-level terms
(e.g., dropping a book in front of participants). Participants
in the high-probability condition were told that they would
be almost certain to get the position if they signed up for the
post, while participants in the low-probability condition
were told that they would be unlikely to get the position if
they signed up for the post. Participants signed up for con-
sideration, and then completed a separate, unrelated study.
At that study’s conclusion, they were given a surprise
“recall test” where they were asked to indicate the nature of
the research assistantship that had been advertised earlier.
Participants in the high-probability condition were more
likely to provide specific than general descriptions of the
assistantship; this tendency was significantly lower for par-
ticipants in the low-probability condition. In addition to
these open-ended responses, participants were asked to
identify the assistantship in specific or general terms on a
forced-choice item. While participants in the high-probabil-
ity condition preferred the specific to the general identifica-
tion, those in the low-probability condition preferred the
general identification to the specific one. (In contrast, actual
signup rates did not differ between the two conditions.)
Visual structure measures also revealed construal differ-
ences as a function of probability. Participants who came
for a computerized study of visual perception were asked to
first complete a paper and pencil practice version of the
study task. During this “practice session” each participant
completed two different tasks: one that they believed they
were likely to later complete in the actual experiment and
the other that they believed that they were unlikely to later
complete in the actual experiment. The two tasks were the
Snowy Pictures Test, which asks participants to name a pic-
ture hidden beneath visual noise, and the Gestalt Comple-
tion Test, in which participants must name an object
presented in fragments (Ekstrom et al., 1976). While differ-
ent, both tasks involve abstracting visual information, andCONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 87
thus performance on both should be greater when associated
with low, as opposed to high, probability. Indeed, this was
the case. Participants’ performance on each task was better
when they believed that they were unlikely to later complete
the task than when they believed that they were likely to
later complete the task. Further, a follow-up study revealed
the opposite pattern of results when the task content was
replaced with a picture completion test in which participants
had to name an element missing within a coherent whole
(Wechsler, 1991). If abstracting information allows one to
better close the gestalt in a picture, this should make it
harder to recognize individual missing elements; in accord
with this prediction, participants performed less well on the
task when they believed they were unlikely (as opposed to
likely) to later complete the task in the actual experiment. In
sum, the effect of probability on performance is dependant
upon the nature of the task: when abstraction facilitates
performance, thinking of something as unlikely leads to
better performance; when abstraction hinders performance,
thinking of something as unlikely leads to diminished
performance.
Pictorial vs. Verbal Representations
Amit (2006) has recently suggested that because psycholog-
ically near events tend to be represented concretely and psy-
chologically distant events tend to be represented abstractly,
psychological distance should impede the processing of
concrete event representations and facilitate the processing
of abstract event representations. In particular, because a
word is an abstract representation that carries the essence of
the referent object whereas a picture is a concrete represen-
tation that carries the properties of the referent object in full
detail, processing of pictures should be facilitated when
they are psychologically near and processing of words
should be facilitated when they are psychologically distant.
In her experiments, Amit presented spatially, temporally, or
socially near or distant items in either a pictorial or verbal
format. For example, in an experiment on spatial distance, a
pair of items was presented either in pictorial or verbal for-
mat inside background pictures that created an illusion of
depth. The items were presented either in proximal or distal
position in the background picture. As expected, partici-
pants responded faster to pictures of objects when they were
spatially near than spatially distant, but they responded
faster to words denoting those objects when they were spa-
tially distant than spatially near. Similar results were
obtained with temporal distance (e.g., modern vs. ancient
objects) and social distance (domestic vs. foreign objects).
Responses were faster when the psychological distance of
an object was compatible with its medium of presentation
(e.g., pictures of domestic objects and names of foreign
objects) than when the distance was incompatible with the
medium of presentation (e.g., pictures of foreign objects and
names of domestic objects). It seems, then, that processing
is most efficient when there is a congruency between the
portrayed distance and the presentation medium.
Abstraction and Distance Judgments
If the relationship between distance and construal is in fact
based upon an over-generalized association, it would make
sense for this relationship to be bi-directional. That is,
manipulations of construal should affect distance percep-
tions much in the same way as the distance of an event
influences its construal. Findings in line with this prediction
have been demonstrated for a variety of distance dimen-
sions. For example, Liberman, Macrae, Sherman, and Trope
(2007 asked participants to indicate either “why” or “how”
a person would perform an activity (e.g., Ron is considering
opening a bank account. Why (How) would Ron do that?);
they then estimated in how much time from that point the
person would do the activity. Because thinking about the
why of an activity is part of a high-level construal whereas
thinking about the how of an activity is part of a low-level
construal, participants responding to why questions should
indicate more distant enactment times than those respond-
ing to how questions. Indeed, this was the case.
A study we have recently conducted extends these find-
ings to the dimension of spatial distance. Participants were
provided with descriptions of a series of events (e.g., pick-
ing up a family member from the airport), some of which
were described in concrete terms with specific details (i.e.,
low-level construal) and others of which were described in
general, superordinate terms (i.e., high-level construal).
They were then asked to estimate the spatial distance
between objects described in the event (e.g., the distance
between the car in which they were traveling and the airport).
As expected, the perceived spatial distance between objects
was greater when the event was described in high-level
terms than when the event was described in low-level terms.
Finally, Wakslak, Trope, and Liberman (2006) found
similar associations between construal and probability judg-
ments. For example, in one study they asked participants to
think about themselves performing either the main task
or the filler task in a described psychology experiment.
Because a focus on central aspects is part of a high-level
construal representation, whereas peripheral aspects are
included in a low-level representation, thinking about an
event’s central aspects should encourage a more high-level
representation of the event. After this construal manipula-
tion, participants indicated how likely they would be to sign
up for the experiment. In line with the proposed association
between construal and probability, participants instructed to
focus on the experiment’s central task judged their likeli-
hood of signing up to be lower (i.e., more distant) than those
instructed to focus on the experiment’s secondary task. Fur-
thermore, additional experiments showed similar effects
using a variety of construal manipulations and types of
probability judgments.88 TROPE, LIBERMAN, WAKSLAK
In sum, extensive research has verified that a relationship
exists between level of construal and the dimensions of tem-
poral, spatial, social, and hypothetical distance. As psycho-
logical distance increases, construals become more abstract,
and as level of abstraction increases, perceptions of psycho-
logical distance too increase. What, then, are implications of
these construal findings? What predictions does CLT put
forward regarding the relationship between psychological
distance and prediction, evaluation, and behavior? In the
coming sections we review findings addressing each of
these questions.
DISTANCE AND PREDICTION
A number of studies have examined the relationship
between distance and prediction. For example, in one set of
studies, Nussbaum, Liberman, and Trope (2006) looked at
the manner in which temporal distance influences the confi-
dence that individuals have in predictions they make about
future outcomes, and the type of information used in mak-
ing these predictions. According to CLT, predictions about
a distant future event should be based on implications of
high-level rather than low-level construals. Theories are, by
definition, abstract constructions of schematic relations
among entities in an idealized, noise-free world. However,
when tested empirically, theoretically derived predictions
may fail to replicate due to nonsystematic influences of the
specific testing conditions. Focusing on theories (the high-
level construal of an experiment) should therefore enhance
confidence in theoretical predictions, whereas focusing on
nonsystematic factors (the low-level construal) should
decrease confidence. Therefore, participants should be more
confident in making theory-based predictions of distant
future experiments than near future experiments.
In one study, for example, participants imagined replicat-
ing five classic psychological findings. Half of the partici-
pants read a short description of the theoretical basis for the
predictions, whereas the other half simply read about the
study and the prediction. In addition, participants imagined
conducting the study either in the distant future (one year)
or the near future (tomorrow). All participants then indi-
cated how confident they were that the predicted effect
would be found in their experiment. Results revealed that
temporal distance increased confidence only when subjects
were provided with a theoretical rationale for the predictions.
In other words, when confidence was derived from a high-
level construct, temporal distance enhanced confidence.
Other aspects of construal should similarly lead to sys-
tematic difference in prediction. For example, Henderson,
Fujita et al. (in press) investigated the effect of spatial dis-
tance on the tendency to base predictions on global, rather
than local, information. In one study, NYU-Washington
Square Campus participants viewed a series of graphs
depicting information about events that took place at NYU
from 1999–2004 (e.g., average number of photocopies per
student per class). The events were described as occurring at
“the NYU campus in Manhattan” (spatially near condition)
or “the NYU campus in Florence, Italy” (spatially distant
condition). Each graph showed either an alleged upward or
a downward trend of cases, with the final year (2004)
always deviating from the global trend (e.g., if the chart
trended upward, the final point trended downward). Partici-
pants then estimated the likelihood that the case for the year
2005 would be consistent with the general trend or with the
deviation evidenced in 2004. In terms of CLT, general
trends convey a high-level abstract rule about how the
future will manifest itself, whereas deviations from trends
represent a low-level, concrete exception to the rule. Indeed,
participants in the spatially distant condition were more
likely to base their predictions on general trends than on
deviations from general trends, whereas participants in the
spatially near condition did not make this distinction.
DISTANCE AND EVALUATION
Like prediction, evaluations made about distant future
events should be based to a larger degree on high-level con-
strual aspects of the situation than evaluations made about
near future events. This prediction has been examined as it
pertains to multiple manifestations of high-level vs. low-level
construals: primary, goal-related vs. secondary, goal-
irrelevant sources of value; feasibility vs. desirability; argu-
ments in favor vs. arguments against an action; idealistic
values vs. pragmatic concerns; and use of nonalignable as
opposed to alignable attributes.
Primary vs. Secondary Features
A number of studies have examined the way in which pri-
mary and secondary features are differentially weighed in
near and distant evaluations. For example, Trope and Liber-
man (2000) examined evaluations of objects and events
containing both a primary and a secondary aspect. In one
study, for instance, they asked participants to imagine buy-
ing a radio set either the next day or in one year, in order to
listen to morning programs. In one version, participants
read that the sound quality of the radio set was good, but
that the clock that was incidentally included was relatively
useless. In a different version, participants read that the
sound quality of the radio set was poor, but that the clock
aspect was quite useful. As expected, participants thinking
about the purchase in the distant future expressed more sat-
isfaction when the central feature was good and the periph-
eral one was poor (i.e., the sound quality was good and the
clock poor) than when the central feature was poor and the
peripheral one was good (i.e., the sound quality was poor
and the clock good); in contrast, near future evaluations did
not differ between these two conditions. Further, the sameCONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 89
temporal changes in preference were found for evaluations
of experimental sessions with interesting and boring main
and filler tasks, as well as experimental sessions with both
affective and cognitive goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant
features.
Desirability vs. Feasibility
When considering goal-directed action, an important dis-
tinction can be made between desirability concerns, which
involve the value of the action’s end-state (i.e., the “why”
aspect of the action), and feasibility concerns, which
involve the means used to reach the end-state (i.e., the
“how” aspect of the activity). Accordingly, high-level con-
struals of an activity should emphasize desirability concerns
whereas low-level construals of an activity should empha-
size feasibility concerns. CLT thus predicts that desirability
concerns should receive greater weight over feasibility con-
cerns as psychological distance increases.
Liberman and Trope (1998) examined this prediction as
it pertains to temporal distance. Participants in one study,
for example, made decisions about three decision situations
(e.g., deciding whether to attend a guest lecture) that they
imagined occurring to them in either the near or distant
future. For each situation, the desirability of the outcome
(e.g., how interesting the lecture was) and its feasibility
(e.g., how convenient the timing of the lecture was) were
varied between participants. Consistent with CLT, results
revealed that the effect of desirability increased over time,
whereas the effect of feasibility decreased. Thus, the attrac-
tiveness of the options increased or decreased as a function
of the source of the attractiveness: when outcomes were
desirable but hard to obtain, attractiveness increased over
time; when outcomes were less desirable but easy to obtain,
attractiveness decreased over time.
Todorov, Goren, and Trope (in press) found that varia-
tions in probability had a similar effect on the impact of
desirability and feasibility issues. For example, in one
study, participants read about a series of promotional cam-
paigns constructed so that they were either high in desirabil-
ity and low in feasibility (e.g., receiving 10 free CDs at an
inconvenient location) or low in desirability and high in fea-
sibility (e.g., receiving 1 free CD at a convenient location).
Under high probability, participants were told that if they
signed up for the campaign, they were almost certain to
receive a voucher for the company’s products. Under low
probability, they were told that they would have about a 1 in
100 chance of receiving a voucher. Results were as
expected: under low probability participants preferred the
high desirability/low feasibility option over the low desir-
ability/high feasibility option, whereas under high probabil-
ity they preferred the low desirability/high feasibility option
over the high desirability/low feasibility option. Thus, desir-
ability was increasingly weighed over feasibility as psycho-
logical distance increased (i.e., as probability diminished).
Thomas, Chandran, and Trope (2006) explicitly applied
this desirability–feasibility distinction to consumer choice.
In line with earlier research on evaluation, they expected
feasibility-related information to have a greater influence on
purchase intentions for the near, rather than distant, future;
in contrast, desirability information should more strongly
increase purchase intentions for the distant, rather than near,
future.
In one study, participants learned that a store they fre-
quent was adding memory sticks (portable USB data stor-
age devices) to their offerings. After reading about the
product and submitting baseline purchase intentions, partic-
ipants saw information about a promotional offer for the
memory stick. This information related either to the prod-
uct’s desirability (the addition of an additional desirable
feature at the same price) or to the product’s feasibility (an
in-store coupon lowering the product’s final price). Further,
participants were either told to imagine deferring the pur-
chase (buying the product at a distant time point instead of
now) or expediting the purchase (buying the product at a
near future time point instead of sometime later). They then
indicated their intention to buy the product at the deferred/
expedited time. In line with expectations,  when the pur-
chase was moved to the near future, information about the
price discount (feasibility) increased purchase intentions but
information about the additional feature (desirability) did
not. In contrast, when the purchase was moved to the distant
future, desirability information increased purchase inten-
tions but feasibility information did not. These findings
suggest that temporal distance augments the effects of desir-
ability information but discounts the effects of feasibility
information.
Building on the idea that individuals naturally increase
their focus on desirability relative to feasibility as temporal
distance increases, Agrawal, Trope, and Liberman (2006)
suggested that highlighting temporally appropriate aspects
of an event at the time that consumers make a decision will
lead consumers to associate greater value with their choice.
In a series of studies they presented participants with a vari-
ety of options, one of which was clearly dominant in that it
was high on both desirability and feasibility dimensions.
Choices were made for either the near or the distant future.
Further, the choice frame was manipulated by telling partic-
ipants to ask themselves questions that made salient either
desirability aspects (e.g., “Does the information content on
the website match your professional interests?”; “Would
I really enjoy this concert?”) or feasibility aspects (e.g., “Is
it convenient, easy, and efficient to find information on this
website?”; “How much does this ticket cost?”). After select-
ing their choice (always the dominant option), participants
indicated the dollar amount that they believed their choice
was worth and completed a value index rating the goodness
of the choice. As expected, participants were willing to pay
more and reported greater value for the distant future option
when the choice was framed to make desirability rather than90 TROPE, LIBERMAN, WAKSLAK
feasibility salient; in contrast, willingness to pay and value
were greater for near future choices when feasibility rather
than desirability was made salient.
Pros vs. Cons
Like other secondary aspects that are subordinate to primary
ones, in deciding whether or not to undertake an action cons
are subordinate to pros. This is because the importance of
pros does not depend upon the existence of cons, whereas
cons are only important when pros are present. Consider,
for example, the decision to undergo a medical procedure. If
the procedure has no benefits, one would not inquire about
its potential complications (one would simply decide not to
proceed). In contrast, one would inquire about the proce-
dure’s benefits whether or not there were potential risks.
Eyal, Liberman, Trope, and Walther (2004) empirically
established this subordination and then examined the impli-
cation that follows from CLT: if cons are subordinate to
pros, then pros should become more salient as temporal dis-
tance from the action increases, whereas cons should
become less salient as temporal distance from the action
increases. Participants generated arguments in favor and
against new (i.e., non-routine) near future or distant future
actions. As predicted, participants generated relatively more
pro arguments and fewer con arguments when the actions
were to take place in the more distant future. The proposed
action involved new exam procedures (e.g., switching to
open-ended questions instead of multiple choice questions),
social policies (e.g., restricting private cars in the city cen-
ter), and a variety of personal and interpersonal behaviors
(e.g., approaching a fellow student and offering to write an
assignment together). In all the studies, participants gener-
ated more pros and less cons as temporal distance from the
actions increased.
In an extension of these findings, Herzog, Hansen, and
Wänke (in press) suggested that if pros are more salient as
temporal distance increases and cons are more salient as
temporal distance decreases then an increase in temporal
distance should make it easier to generate pros and more
difficult to generate cons. Further, because attitudes tend to
be more in line with content when the retrieval is experi-
enced as easy (Wänke & Bless, 2000), the ease of retrieval
associated with generating pros and cons of near and distant
future activities should influence attitudes toward those
activities, even when the number of arguments is held con-
stant. In a test of these ideas, participants read about a pro-
posed action that was to happen in the near or distant future
and were instructed to write down either four pros or four
cons regarding the activity. They then rated the ease of gen-
erating these arguments as well as their attitude regarding
the described action. As expected, participants (a) found it
easier to generate pros and more difficult to generate cons
when the issue concerned the distant rather than near future
and (b) had more favorable attitudes toward the action when
it was to occur in the distant future. Mediational analysis
indicated that, indeed, the ease of retrieval effect was at
least partially responsible for the effect of temporal distance
on attitudes.
Idealistic Values vs. Pragmatic Concerns
Just as cons are subordinate to pros, Kivetz and Tyler (2007)
argue that pragmatic concerns are subordinate to people’s
inner, idealistic values. Accordingly, they suggest that a dis-
tal perspective encourages the expression of an idealistic
self (a value-oriented self-representation that reflects a per-
son’s true, inner self and places principles above practical
concerns), which increases the value placed upon identity-
related concerns (e.g., respect, quality of treatment). In con-
trast, a proximal time perspective encourages the expression
of a pragmatic self (a self-representation that is focused on
available opportunities and constraints and is guided by the
practicality of action), increasing the value placed upon
instrumental concerns (e.g., financial benefits, extrinsic
rewards). In line with this conceptualization, students who
considered an academic course to start the next academic
year (distant future outcome) focused on identity-oriented
benefits of the course (e.g., whether the professor treated
students with respect). In contrast, when considering a
course to start a few days later, participants concentrated on
instrumental benefits of the course (e.g., the professor’s ten-
dency to give high grades).
Similarly reasoning that values and ideals influence eval-
uation more in the distant future than in the near future,
Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, and Liberman (2006) exam-
ined temporal shifts in the persuasiveness of arguments that
highlighted either a value-related product feature or a value-
neutral product feature. Participants imagined finding a sale
for DVD players either that week (near future condition) or
in three months (distant future condition). They then viewed
a number of arguments endorsing the purchase of a particu-
lar DVD player. For half of the participants, the argument
list included a value-related argument (the DVD player is
made of environmentally-friendly materials), whereas for
the other half, all the arguments were value-neutral. As
expected, product evaluations made by participants consid-
ering the purchase in the distant future were more positive
when the message included a value-related argument than
when it consisted only of a value-neutral argument. In con-
trast, when participants considered the purchase in the near
future, evaluations did not differ on the basis of inclusion of
a value-related feature. Thus, persuasive arguments appeal-
ing to idealistic values appear to be more persuasive for
temporally distant, as opposed to near, attitude objects.
Alignable vs. Nonalignable Attributes
Finally, distance influences evaluations not only as a func-
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context. Structural alignment theory (Gentner & Markman,
1994) suggests that in choosing among alternatives individ-
uals primarily rely on alignable differences (common
attributes that have different levels across alternatives)
rather than nonalignable differences (attributes in one alter-
native that do not have a corresponding attribute in other
alternatives), because nonalignable differences are more
difficult to process. Incorporating a CLT perspective,
Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu (2005) reasoned that because
the comparability of options increases when their attributes
are thought about abstractly (Johnson, 1984), decisions that
have distant future consequences (relative to near future
consequences) will involve an increased consideration of
nonalignable attributes. In a test of this prediction, partici-
pants evaluated two brands of potato chips and selected one
brand to receive either at the end of the session (near future)
or at the end of the semester (distant future). The two brands
were designed on the basis of pretesting to be equally attractive
overall; one of the brands, however, was designed to be bet-
ter on its alignable attributes, whereas the other brand was
better on its nonalignable attributes. As expected, temporal
distance shifted both evaluations and choice toward the
nonalignable better option over the alignable better option,
indicating an increased reliance on nonalignable attributes
when making decisions with distant future consequences.
DISTANCE AND BEHAVIOR
Like predictions and evaluations, behavior should be
increasingly based on high-level construal aspects as psy-
chological distance increases. Investigations in this area
have focused on a variety of construal aspects and examined
a range of behaviors. These approaches include examining
the impact of values and general attitudes on behavioral
intentions, tradeoffs of primary and secondary concerns
within a negotiation context, self-control, the sunk-cost
bias, risk perception, and consumer impatience.
Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitudes 
and Values
We argued earlier that values and general attitudes are part
of high-level construals; correspondingly, we would expect
these constructs to be more readily applied to psychologi-
cally distant situations than to psychologically near situa-
tions. In an examination of this prediction, Sagristano,
Trope, Eyal, and Liberman (2006) used Schwartz’s (1992)
value questionnaire to measure the importance participants
placed on a wide range of values (e.g., hedonism, benevo-
lence, power). They then asked participants to imagine 30
behaviors (e.g., rest as much as I can) and to indicate the
likelihood of performing each behavior in either the near or
the distant future. Correlations of the value ratings with the
corresponding behavioral intentions revealed that values
were more strongly associated with behaviors planned for
the distant future than those planned for the near future. Fur-
ther, a follow-up study found similar results when partici-
pants considered actual behavioral opportunities. In the first
session, Sagristano et al. (2006) measured participants’ gen-
eral attitudes toward a variety of activities (e.g., blood dona-
tion); in the second, unconnected, session, participants were
offered an opportunity to engage in each of these activities
in either the near future (the next two days) or the distant
future (several weeks later). In line with the predictions,
participants’ general attitudes were better predictors of
behavioral intentions for distant future opportunities than
for near future opportunities.
While values are in and of themselves high-level con-
structs, it is also possible to distinguish between an individ-
ual’s central, core values and peripheral, secondary values.
When a number of values are relevant to a psychologically
distant situation, we would expect the value conflict to be
solved in favor of the person’s predominant, central values;
in contrast, we would expect a person’s near future plans to
reflect less well the distinction between his or her primary
and secondary values. Eyal, Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope
(2006) tested these predictions. In one study, for example,
they examined the way that the centrality of altruism vs.
achievement values predicted near and distant intentions
related to solving a dilemma between helping a friend and
getting ahead by working extra hours. As expected, partici-
pants who were predominantly altruistic planned to be more
cooperative in the distant future than in the near future; in
contrast, participants who were predominantly achievement
oriented planned to be more achieving in the distant future
than in the near future. Thus, as distance increased, partici-
pants increasingly solved the conflict in favor of the value
that they personally found to be more central.
Logrolling in Negotiation
As with values and attitudes, issues within an interpersonal
negotiation can differ in their centrality and worth. If a pair
of negotiators can trade off their lowest and highest priority
issues (e.g., give in on secondary issues in exchange for get-
ting what they want on high priority issues, a process called
logrolling), they are more likely to succeed in “expanding
the pie,” maximizing both individual and joint outcomes.
Because negotiators should be expected to focus more on
central concerns and less on peripheral concerns as distance
increases, we would expect to see more logrolling agree-
ments in a distant future than near future context. Examin-
ing this idea within the context of a live negotiation,
Henderson, Trope, and Carnevale (2006) found that while
91% of dyads with a temporally distant perspective reached
a fully logrolling agreement, only 50% of dyads with a tem-
porally near perspective did so. Further, results showed that
distant future participants approached the negotiation in a
more global, structured manner than near future participants,92 TROPE, LIBERMAN, WAKSLAK
leading to an increase in both individual and joint outcomes
for the distant future participants.
Self-control
Acting in line with one’s primary, central objective—as
opposed to incidental, secondary factors—is one hallmark
of exerting self-control. Accordingly, Fujita, Trope, Liberman,
and Levin-Sagi (2006) reasoned that activating a high-level
construal orientation through procedural priming (as
opposed to a low-level construal orientation) should lead to
greater exertion of self-control. In one study, for example,
participants considered either why or how they engaged in a
given action (this manipulation has been shown to activate
high- and low-level construals, respectively; see Freitas,
Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004). Next, participants held a hand-
grip (cf. Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998) ostensibly to
receive self-relevant information. They were told that the
longer they squeezed the handgrip (a task that causes
increasing discomfort), the more accurate the feedback from
the assessment would be. Participants thus had to choose
between receiving increasingly self-relevant feedback (a
high-level feature) and relieving their hand’s discomfort (a
low-level feature). As expected, those primed to a high-
level construal held the handgrip longer than those primed
to a low-level construal, revealing a relationship between
high-level construal and self-control. Furthermore, studies
using a different construal manipulation (a superordinate vs.
subordinate categorization task), found similar self-control
effects on both evaluations of temptations (Study 4) and
behavioral intentions to undertake activities requiring self-
control (Study 3).
Kivetz and Simonson (2002) used a similar rationale in
an investigation of what they term hyperopia, or reverse
self-control. These authors argue that sometimes people
must exert self-control in order to indulge in luxuries that
they would not ordinarily allow themselves. Like other
forms of self-control, psychological distance should
enhance this tendency. Indeed, results revealed that partici-
pants were increasingly likely to choose a luxury promo-
tional option (e.g., a cruise) as opposed to a practical
promotional option (e.g., a cash prize) as temporal distance
increased. Further, reducing the probability of winning the
prize (in place of increasing temporal distance) similarly led
to an increased selection of the luxury prize alternative.
Sunk-cost Bias
Like classic self-control problems, the sunk-cost bias can be
thought of as a failure to act in line with primary, relevant
objectives. The sunk-cost error, referred to in the manage-
ment literature as “escalation of commitment” (cf. Staw,
1981), is the tendency to continue to commit resources (e.g.,
money, time) to a failing course of action. According to
rational models, future-oriented decisions should be made
on the basis of future-oriented costs and benefits; past
investments are essentially irrelevant. Further, motivations
that arise from the past investment itself (e.g., self-justification,
Brockner, 1992; “don’t waste” heuristic, Arkes & Blumer,
1985) should be secondary to the primary goal at hand (e.g.,
making a good investment). Increased psychological dis-
tance should therefore reduce the tendency to make this
error. Investigating this phenomenon, Wakslak, Liberman,
and Trope (2006) presented NYU participants with Arkes
and Blumer’s (1985) classic “radar blank plane” scenario in
which participants decide whether to commit resources to a
plane that they have previously invested in but that new
information reveals is unlikely to yield a profit. Half of par-
ticipants were told that the company making the planes was
located far away, on the West Coast; the other half were told
that the company was located quite nearby, on the East
Coast. As expected, participants’ tendency to make the
sunk-cost error was reduced when the scenario occurred in a
distant as opposed to a near location. Further results repli-
cated this effect using temporal distance in place of spatial
distance and examining a range of sunk-cost phenomena.
Risk Perceptions and Temporal Frames
Chandran and Menon (2004) suggested that distance-related
factors could be used to manipulate the concreteness of a
risk communication, thereby influencing individuals’ risk
perceptions and behavioral intentions. Extending CLT’s
logic to temporal frames (describing events as happening
either “every day” or “every year”), they demonstrated that
temporal framing effects mimic temporal distance effects
such that risks presented in a day frame were perceived as
closer in time, more concrete, and more probable (thus
evoking a greater sense of threat) than those presented in a
year frame. In one study, for example, participants read an
article about heart disease. Events in the article were pre-
sented in either a day frame or an year frame. In addition,
the valence of the outcome was manipulated so that the out-
comes were either negative (e.g., “every day/year a signifi-
cant number of people succumb to heart disease”) or
positive (e.g., “every day/year a significant number of peo-
ple avert heart disease”). When the outcome was framed
negatively (i.e., as a risk), participants in the day frame con-
dition (vs. those in the year frame) reported higher self-risk
perceptions, believed heart disease was a more serious
issue, were more anxious about heart disease, evaluated the
article they read as more effective, and expressed stronger
behavioral intentions to engage in a variety of educational
and preventive behaviors aimed at curtailing heart disease.
In contrast, when the outcome was framed positively (i.e.,
as avoiding a risk), the reverse patterns emerged. In other
words, when the outcome consisted of a health hazard, the
day (vs. year) frame made the hazard seem more proximal
and concrete, evoking a stronger sense of risk and threat;
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day (vs. year) frame made escaping the hazard seem more
proximal and concrete, evoking a weaker sense of risk and
threat.
Consumer Impatience
Researchers interested in intertemporal decision-making
(for a review see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue,
2002) have consistently found evidence for consumer impa-
tience, that is, a preference by consumers for smaller,
sooner benefits over later, larger ones. Further, as the time
horizon gets longer, this pattern of impatience decreases.
Recently, Malkoc, Zauberman, and Bettman (2006) have
argued that abstract processing should lead consumers to
think in a decontextualized manner, increasing their ten-
dency for consistency in intertemporal preferences. In one
study, for instance, participants were primed with a word
search that used either abstract or concrete words. In an
unconnected task, participants imagined receiving a $75 gift
certificate from amazon.com, and indicated how much
money they would require to delay the redemption of this
gift certificate by 3 months and by 1 year. As expected, par-
ticipants primed with abstract words demonstrated a
decreased level of present bias relative to those primed with
concrete words (i.e., they showed a lower decline over time
in the monthly amount they would require to delay con-
sumption). Thus, high-level construal (vs. low-level con-
strual) priming resulted in a more consistent set of
intertemporal preferences.
In summary, a range of studies suggest that when form-
ing predictions, evaluations, and behavioral intentions for
distant events, individuals rely primarily on high-level con-
struals; when making these assessments for near events,
low-level construal information is increasingly incorporated
into the decision making process. This basic effect has been
replicated across multiple dimensions of psychological dis-
tance and has been found to influence a large number of
important outcome variables. Furthermore, these effects
occur despite the equally irreversible nature of the near and
distant decisions and the equal information available
regarding the near and distant options. Individuals’ distant
choices are thus not characterized by uncertainty or indiffer-
ence; rather these choices seem to discriminate most clearly
between alternatives. In our view, this is because these deci-
sions are made on the basis of a high-level construal repre-
sentation that is more structured and schematic than a
corresponding low-level construal.
TOWARD A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE
At the beginning of this paper, we claimed that an event is
psychologically distant whenever it is removed from direct
experience. In particular, we pointed at four dimensions
along which distancing commonly occurs: temporal dis-
tance, spatial distance, social distance, and hypotheticality.
Findings in fact indicate that each of these dimensions
shares a common relationship with construal; temporally
distant, spatially distant, socially distant, and unlikely
events are represented in a more abstract, high-level manner
than are their corresponding proximal alternatives. Accord-
ingly, when predictions, evaluations, and behavioral inten-
tions are made regarding events distanced on any of these
dimensions, they are increasingly based on central, abstract
features of the situation rather than peripheral, concrete fea-
tures. In addition, using an implicit association paradigm,
Bar-Anan, Liberman, and Trope (2006) found evidence for
implicit associations between each of these distance dimen-
sions and level of construal. Specifically, using a single
consistent paradigm to investigate construal effects across
these four distance dimensions, results showed shorter
response times when distance-related words were paired
with high-level construal stimuli and proximal-related
words were paired with low-level construal stimuli than
with incongruent pairings.
One implication of the current framework is that distance
dimensions themselves should be interrelated. In line with
this suggestion, Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, and Algom
(in press) recently found evidence for the automatic associa-
tions of distance dimensions. Using a picture-word version
of the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), participants discrim-
inated between cues of one psychological distance dimen-
sion while ignoring cues of another psychological distance
dimension. If psychological distance is a shared meaning of
various distance dimensions, it should be easier to perform
the task when the relevant and irrelevant cues are congruent
(as opposed to incongruent) in terms of psychological dis-
tance. Participants viewed perspective pictures containing
an arrow that was pointing to either a proximal or a distal
point on the landscape shown in the picture; inside the
arrow was printed a word denoting either a psychologically
proximal entity (e.g., tomorrow, we, sure) or a psychologi-
cally distal entity (e.g., year, others, maybe). In a spatial dis-
crimination version of the task, participants had to indicate
whether the arrow pointed to a proximal or a distal location.
In a semantic discrimination version, participants had to
indicate what the word printed on the arrow was. In both
tasks, and across the distance dimensions, participants were
faster when responding to distant congruent stimuli (e.g.,
“we” printed on proximal arrow) than distant incongruent
stimuli (e.g., “we” printed on distal arrow).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed the relationship between
construal and four dimensions of psychological distance:
temporal distance, spatial distance, social distance, and
hypotheticality. Each of these dimensions is highly relevant94 TROPE, LIBERMAN, WAKSLAK
to the psychology of consumer decision-making. For exam-
ple, individuals often commit now to a decision that will go
into effect at a later point. It is similarly common to buy
something now for use at a later date. Spatial distance, too,
is becoming an increasingly prevalent aspect of consumer
decisions: with the increase in purchases made over the
internet, it is becoming ever-more routine to purchase prod-
ucts from distantly located sellers. Similarly, the existence
of multinational companies and the ensuing globalization
means that business dealings frequently occur with partners
in remote spatial locations. Social distance may have impli-
cations when purchases are made on behalf of someone who
is socially distant or close to oneself (e.g., buying a present
for a boss vs. employee, self vs. similar other vs. dissimilar
other). Likewise, people may experience more or less social
distance from salespeople or customer service representa-
tives with whom they interact (e.g., experienced power
vis-à-vis a salesperson; perceived similarity to a customer
service representative). Finally, hypotheticality is an issue
whenever people make choices that have uncertain out-
comes; examples include purchasable options that are them-
selves risky (e.g., stocks, sign-ups for dating websites) as
well as promotional marketing campaigns whose outcomes
differ in probability.
Of course, each of these four domains undoubtedly has
its own unique motivational and cognitive aspects. While
not questioning this truth, research grounded in CLT sug-
gests that events distanced on any of these dimensions are
represented in a schematic, abstract manner that empha-
sizes central and superordinate features (high-level con-
struals), whereas proximal events are represented in a
concrete, less schematic manner that includes incidental
and subordinate features (low-level construals). Further-
more, research examining prediction, evaluation, and
behavior shows the range of implications that are suggested
by this framework. Given the importance of these dimen-
sions to consumer decisions, we believe that investigations
have only begun to tap the potential of this approach and
that there remains much work to be done on both a theoret-
ical and applied level. It is our hope that approaching vari-
ous dimensions under the umbrella of psychological
distance will create a unifying theoretical framework that
will stimulate exploration and allow us to parsimoniously
understand a range of seemingly unrelated psychological
phenomena.
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